Jorge Alberto Fernandez
We should start by
recognizing that for the members of the FAT who knew
and worked with Dale Hathaway it is a major challenge
to comment on his articles and those of his critics
without our judgements being too sentimental about
the irreparable loss that we are still trying to overcome
(if you translate this phrase again into Spanish the
original meaning changes a lot, what about "without
our judgements showing much of this feeling of irreparable
loss that we have not assumed completely", or
something like this, -maybe you're laughing at it)
. In any case, the best way we can pay homage to our
dear friend is by participating in this franc and
open discussion which was a fundamental part of our
relationship (by participating in the discussion in
this franc and open way which was...?).
What Hathaway offers
us in his article “Mexico’s FAT and the
Problem of Unionizing Maquiladoras” is more
than anything a recounting of the conditions, problems
and contexts in the way that the FAT has (re)designed
its strategy for organizing in the maquiladoras, which
finally became the establishment of the first CETLAC
in Ciudad Juarez.
In effect, the CETLAC
aperture on the border is the jumping off point of
an integral long term project conceived and(?) designed
and in application to overcome this dynamic of “work
over pedido” ???(we can use here the expression
you told me yesterday by phone) which came to be the
constant in the work of the FAT in this sector in
the region. In the majority of cases that Hathaway
narrates, the FAT was called to attend to a problem
already in progress in a workplace, and was the workers
themselves who in some way knew about the FAT or because
of allies made contact in the first instance and then
linked to the workers of the FAT, more than involving
them as a result of a prior planning process that
sustained participation. The establishment of the
CETLAC in this context signified a previous labor
of self critique of recent experiences in organizing
in the maquiladoras. The conclusions of this process
are significantly harsher than the critiques of Doctor
French; they punctuate this lack of long term vision
previously mentioned, the absence of a program of
union training and education (formacion) which complement
the process of organizing and errors of coordination
and communication between allies which grow in each
case . All of this without (stop) recognizing the
decisive continued, perhaps increased, importance
that the operating system of complicity of company-government-charro
(union) , as continues to be demonstrated with the
continued presence of impunity of professional goons
in the struggles of Duro and ITAPSA, with the deliberate
delays in the actions of the authorities (CASA in
Ciudad Juarez) and in all of the unjustified layoffs
which always serve as a cover (what if we use "which
always become as a result of the attempt to..."?)
(saldo del intento = result of the attempt) to beat
real union representation.
Nevertheless, all
of these limitations and shortcomings in the work
of the FAT, which Hathaway does not detail sufficiently,
but also does not omit, it is difficult to be able
to steer the reader “to conclude that (he) offers
little more than a discouraging narrative of successive
defeats and failures,” as French proposes, without
finding incomprehension or prejudice in the piece.
Hathaway’s account, (which) in many ways coincides
with the internal values of the FAT, including (includes?)
advances quite important about the diffusion of the
problem of workers in the maquiladoras at the international
level, and at the national level have felt a great
precedent in terms of the (impostergable = unpostponable,
urgent?) necessity to implement the account of secret
votes in the disputes for titularity (do you think
this concept is clear enough for an US reader? To
have the "titularity" of the CC means that
the union is the only officially recognized to bargain
in the name of the workers, with the employer and
the authorities and to call for the CC to be accomplished)
of Collective Contracts.
There is another crucial
aspect of Hathaway’s article that is lamentably
not fully understood in French’s reply: the
conjunction of a theoretical and strategic discussion
(the possibilities and concrete condition of work
for the FAT) with concern about the need for an ethical
argument in the terrain of labor. To us, it looks
like the idea of “authentic unionism as an “analytic
category” is a legitimate subject for an academic
debate with other goals that those written, and this
does not disqualify the value judgements that abound
in the Hathaway text as a simple “contrast between
authentic unions and all the others,” “melodramatic
overstatement,” “blanket condemnation
of the overwhelming majority of Mexican unions…”
or “Manichean categories.” A more serene
piece from Hathaway would lead us to conclude that
he never had the intention of creating an epic battle
between good and evil, instead to put forth in utmost
importance the discussion of the theme of “union
ethic.” (ethic in the terrain of unions?)
For Hathaway, the
irrefutable moral character of the FAT, obtained through
more than forty years of struggle against assimilation
(simulation) and corruption in the labor world represents
a specific value that is converted (turns the FAT?)
into an option not only possible but also desirable
of alternative worker organizing. This affirmation
(contudente = forceful, convincing?) carries implicitly
the characterization of the system of corporate control
of workers through the official central councils (CTM,
CROC, etc.) as a form of union organizing that openly
denigrates the worker, annuls the dignity of the person
by incorporating him/her into a chain of corruption
(for anything that you might solicit of the union,
you must provide compensation or gifts to your representative)
and perverts the very concept of “representative
interests.”
If we are clear on
this, we understand Hathaway’s
critique of the AFL-CIO for sustaining relationships
with the CROC , criticism that we certainly share
in the FAT partially in contrast to the reality of
Mexican unionism and the possibility for international
collaboration.
This is a good space
to insist once again that such corruption and union
repression and the act of putting the interests of
leaders above those of the workers constitutes the
essence of official unionism in Mexico and in no manner
are “isolated actions” or “deviations”
that could be corrected. When speaking about unions
or democratic sections within the official central
councils, it is generally alluding to the infiltration
of organization (like the FAT) or insurgence of workers
more than any institutional effort at democratic reform.
Obviously French is correct in affirming that “million
and not 1000’s” of workers are
organized through official central councils, but
he omits saying that the immense majority of them
are not even aware that they are affiliated and have
never had contact with their supposed representatives.
It is in this point that the dramatic reality and
grave implication of the “sweetheart deals,”
(Babe: you use this expression here and "protection
contracts" in the next paragraph, maybe it would
be more useful to use always the same expression to
avoid confusion) question on which French enters into
a strong contradiction by confusing an affirmation
of Hathaway (“around 90% of the contracts in
Mexico are “sweetheard deals.”) considering
a ideological exaggeration (“by definition labor
contracts under capitalism protect employers to one
degree or another”), to then recognize the existence
of these “sweetheard protection contracts.”
The protection contracts
are signed to protect the company from workers organizing
to get labor benefits. When the maquiladora wants
to establish in Mexico, it interviews with local authorities,
who present a type of catalog of central councils,
the company chooses one, signs a collective contract
that authorizes minimal conditions required by law
(by merely signing the contract, a charro leader receives
a percentage of the total of the amount projected
and is given a commitment of a percentage of each
annual salary revision which is usually 2-5%) and
this is only until the plant opens and contracts personnel,
who come in without even knowing about the charro
union. When workers emplazan /summon? (I think it's
correct) the company through signing a contract or
by establishing (try to establish?) a union discover
that there already exists a contract registered with
authorities. This is the mode of collective contracts
typical in the maquiladoras, although it is not exclusive
in that domain, as Juarez well notes.
With only this deceit,
it is clear why you cannot leave emphasizing the pertinence
that labor reform resumes in this ethical dimension.
The strategy of the
FAT in the maquiladoras contemplates this aspect and
links it with this realistic appreciation of the concrete
conditions that French demands. Tactically it has
been decided not to attack directly the central councils
for the simple reason of avoiding direct repression
and the closure and relocation of factories (notnternational
solidarity, which approach with a profundity and knowledge.
hing to comment on,
just wanted to say I love you madly), but the objective
in the long run is to substitute this corrupt simulation
for true representation of the workers; for this reason
we emphasize the aspect of union and political education
and promote the connecting of labor with other aspect
of life of the workers and their communities.
This is what Hathaway
in his article and something that French leaves to
the side without demeriting (or denying?) many other
aspects, principally about the bases of i
